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Abstract 
Given their exposure to diverse institutional settings, decision making in multinational 
enterprises (MNE) is marked by inconsistencies and conflict. Within the comparative 
institutional analysis (CIA) literature, such inconsistencies are seen as a source of 
experimentation or innovation. By contrast, in the international business (IB) literature, 
institutions are primarily understood as constraints on MNE activity.  The latter focuses on 
‘institutional effects’ taking institutions as stable and determining of social agency, and says 
very little about how institutions shape capabilities of organizations to pursue a variety of 
strategies or change in diverse institutional settings. As a way of addressing this limitation, we 
aim to understand the conditions that enable actors to engage in strategic action despite 
institutional pressures towards statis. We demonstrate, through comparative case studies of 
two large MNEs, headquartered in Germany and the UK, that agency within MNEs is 
influenced by a fit between MNE coordination structures shaped by home country institutions 
and host country institutions’ demands for flexibility or collaboration. Institutional 
incompatibilities between home and host contexts are unlikely to trigger actors’ reflective 
capacity to change if the actors cannot draw on supportive coordination structures in the 
MNE.  
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Introduction 
Decision making in MNEs is marked by inconsistencies and conflict owing to their exposure 
to diverse institutional settings. Although institutions are primarily understood as constraints 
on MNE activity, inconsistencies between them can be a source of experimentation or 
innovation. Inspired by this theoretical insight, we aim to understand the conditions that 
enable actors to engage in strategic action despite institutional pressures towards statis. We 
emphasize the enabling effects of institutions and demonstrate the importance of a fit between 
MNE coordination structures shaped by home country institutions and host country 
institutions’ demand for flexibility or collaboration in fostering agency.  
 Institutional theory has provided a rich theoretical foundation in MNE research (e.g. 
Dacin et al. 2002; Djelic and Quack 2003). However, most IB scholars have adopted a narrow 
view of institutions, drawing predominantly on the institutional economics understanding of 
institutions as ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). They study institutions in terms of how 
diverse regulatory rules and legal norms affect the performance of MNEs (Brouthers, 2002) or 
expose firms to politically-related hazards (Delios and Henisz, 2000). Accordingly, 
institutions are understood as constraints on MNE activity, through transaction costs, differing 
resource environments or institutional distance. In this view, actors are understood as agents 
for legitimizing organizations to enhance the organization’s likelihood of survival (Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008). However, this view of institutions and their relationship to the agency of 
individual actors in the MNE is rather constrained. Achieving and maintaining legitimacy are 
difficult for MNEs given their operation in multiple, fragmented, often conflicting 
institutional environments (Kostova et al., 2008). Ambiguity created by such diversity can 
create room for strategic responses to institutions that involve creative reinterpretation and 
redeployment of resources for new purposes (Jackson, 2005). In other words, the exposure to 
multiple institutional environments can trigger innovative change. Institutional change can 
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result as actors use contradictions to reflect on the limits of existing institutional arrangements 
and to inspire ideas for new ones (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The question of how actors are 
enabled to engage in institutional work remains largely unanswered (Battilana and D’Aunno, 
2009). Consequently, we aim to address how institutionally-embedded actors are enabled to 
instigate change. 
 Given our discontent with the rather constrained view of institutions in the IB field, 
we turn our attention to comparative institutional analysis (CIA). Rather than adopting a 
variable-based approach to viewing institutional diversity, CIA scholars study institutions as 
interactively constituted, recognizing the social interactions among different institutional 
dimensions (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). As firms’ interactions are shaped by various 
institutions outside the firm, they may develop different internal capabilities and foundations 
for competitive advantage across countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 2007). Similar 
to the researchers in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003), CIA 
scholars see institutions as both enabling and constraining actors. 
 More recently, CIA scholars have been shedding light on how institutions originate 
and evolve by introducing more agency into the creation and change of institutions (e.g. 
Crouch, 2005; Hancké and Goyer, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). They seek to explain 
how actors experiment with novel uses and combinations of institutions to solve coordination 
problems or develop specific capabilities. In addition to reinterpreting and reforming existing 
institutions, actors are also seen as mobilizing resources to defect (i.e. ignore) institutions 
(Hall and Thelen, 2009). Misalignments between institutionalized rules and situational 
demands for resources can create room for actors to engage in innovative changes (Crouch, 
2005). Seo and Creed (2002) refer to this as tensions within and between social systems that 
transform the embedded social actors into the change agents of established institutions.  
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 While we believe that these new developments in CIA have added important new 
perspectives for the study of MNEs, in this study, we contribute further by bringing a new 
understanding to the idea of actor agency within MNEs that operate in diverse, potentially 
conflicting, institutional environments, i.e. the motivation and ability of actors, both 
individual (subsidiary managers) and collective (subsidiaries as a whole), to pursue and effect 
change where they can draw on supportive coordination structures in MNEs. Specifically, in 
our study, we examined the different forms of agency displayed by subsidiaries in the area of 
product development where there were different demands from home institutions, manifested 
in MNE structures, and host country institutions.  
 First, we distinguish between different forms of agency. We then offer a new 
perspective on how different types of agency emerge and what their relationship with 
different institutional contexts is. By contrast to the IB literature, we show that institutions do 
not just constrain but also enable agency, and that active agency can, in turn, transform 
institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth, 2003)1. Moreover, by contrast to the CIA 
literature, the study considers not just the compatibility of institutions between home and host 
countries, but also explores the role of MNE coordination structures in shaping the types of 
actor agency that emerge. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Agency and Institutions within IB 
The IB literature acknowledges the role of institutions in firm strategy and performance 
across nations. The ‘institution-based view of strategy’ in IB research (Peng, 2002, 2003) 
provides crucial explanations for why transaction costs arise, why resources are developed in 
a particular way and how organizations evolve. Institutions are understood as regulatory rules 
and legal norms that affect location decisions (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), mode-of-entry 
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decisions and performance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 
2007; Brouthers, 2002), and firm strategies (e.g. Zhao, 2006). The success of MNE strategies 
such as agglomeration or export of practices depends on the specific types of national 
institution, such as the degree of market development (Lee and Beamish, 1995) or distance 
from the host country (Ghemawat, 2001). Comparative advantage is attained through a fit of 
strategy to host institutional context. For example, Meyer (2001) demonstrates that MNEs 
entering transition economies adapt their strategies to the local institutions in order to reduce 
exposure to highly imperfect markets.  
 IB scholars investigate single institutional effects ceteris paribus (Jackson and Deeg, 
2008). They adopt a variable-based approach to institutional diversity along discrete 
parameters at a high level of aggregation. This approach overlooks the potential for 
interactions among different institutional features of countries that lead to differences in kind. 
Rather, it aims to capture difference in terms of degree of institutional distance (Jackson and 
Deeg, 2008). Although some IB literature and works on entrepreneurship in international 
settings (e.g. Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003) recognize that institutions do not fully determine 
action (e.g. Henisz and Zelner, 2005), the view of institutions, by the very nature of its 
definition as ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’ (North, 1990: 
3), remains rather focused on how institutions constrain strategic choice (e.g. Peng et al., 
2009). Most existing literature has emphasized the resources and capabilities of the entering 
firm (Peng, 2001), and its need to minimise transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hill 
et al., 1990). For instance, investments might be discouraged into institutionally distant 
countries (e.g. Treviňo and Mixon, 2004; Delios and Beamish, 1999), in particular in markets 
in which policy uncertainty is high (Henisz and Delios, 2001). The larger the institutional 
distance, the more difficult it becomes for the MNE to establish legitimacy in the host country 
and to transfer knowledge to foreign subsidiaries. The distance between home and host 
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institutional contexts implies costs for coordinating activities cross-nationally. Given that the 
transaction costs of engaging in these markets are relatively higher, MNEs have to devise 
strategies to overcome these constraints (Peng, 2008). In attempting to reduce transaction 
costs, it is observed that companies must choose between a hierarchy and a market mode of 
organizing, that is they are motivated by the internalization incentives related to control (e.g. 
Meyer, 2001). For example, MNEs might establish a joint venture to access resources held by 
local firms to help counteract idiosyncrasies of a weak institutional context (Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009). This conceptualization of strategic choice does not 
consider how institutions shape the capabilities of organizations to pursue different strategies. 
Overall, firms are seen largely as unitary, rational, and self-interested actors with stable 
preferences, constrained by institutional rules and norms. We address this limitation in the 
mainstream IB literature by demonstrating the enabling effect of institutions where host 
institutional demands are met by MNE structures that are shaped by home country 
institutions.  
 
Agency and Institutions within CIA 
CIA has a long tradition in sociology and political science, and has contributed to the 
diversity in employment systems (Streeck, 1992), and corporate governance (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). In CIA, institutions are understood as systemically interdependent 
configurations resulting in internal cohesion, i.e. as types that generate a particular systemic 
logic of economic action and competitive advantages related to complementarities among 
those institutions (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). The emphasis is on how and why institutions 
differ across countries, often starting from a thick description of institutions (see Redding, 
2005) and a holistic analysis of institutions within a specific national ‘case’. Rather than 
treating institutional diversity in terms of ‘distance’, the CIA approach has developed a theory 
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of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional settings have distinct 
strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Institutions are seen by 
CIA scholars not only as constraints but also as resources for solving key problems of 
economic coordination through non-economic, value-rational sets of commitments (Jackson 
and Deeg, 2008). Institutions shape financial and labour systems that are collectively 
available to firms, as well as market and non-market forms of coordination (Whitley, 1999). 
This leads to diverse organizational capabilities. The assumption is that each firm is a 
coalition among different types of investors, employees and managers whose interactions are 
shaped by various institutions outside the firm. Institutional diversity affects the ability of 
MNEs to adapt their strategy to host country institutions (Whitley, 2007). In spite of the same 
degree of ‘institutional distance’, the particular types of home country institutions can lead to 
different strategic adaptations on the part of MNEs (e.g. Edwards and Ferner, 2002; Saka, 
2004). Furthermore, MNE strategies may be shaped by arbitrage between different 
institutional systems (e.g. Börch, 2007). The embeddedness of MNEs in their home country 
institutions has a significant influence on the development of distinctive competences. For 
instance, firms in countries with a strong capacity for incremental innovation and diversified 
quality production, such as Germany, might be more likely to retain manufacturing in their 
home country than firms in liberal market economies (e.g. Geppert et al., 2003). The CIA 
approach to MNE strategy underscores institutional complementarities, i.e. the functional 
interactions between institutions in a particular case rather than single institutional variables. 
By contrast to the IB literature, CIA sees competitive advantage not so much as a fit of 
strategy to an institutional context but in terms of institutionally shaped capabilities for 
different strategies and types of coordination.  
 Going further, neo-institutional studies have documented the ability of actors, in 
particular those with some key strategic resources or other forms of power, to have significant 
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impacts on the evolution of institutions and fields (Greenwood et al., 2002), including both 
institutional transformation (radical change) and deinstitutionalization (gradual change). 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 224) argue that new institutions can be created through 
complementing or directly challenging existing institutions.  
 Based on these views, one can argue that agency is not the result of a degree of 
adaptation to a given institutional environment, but a response to interactions among different 
institutional features of countries. CIA goes on to show that misalignments between 
institutionalized rules and situational demands are the space in which actors’ choices may 
lead to innovative changes (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). However, we believe 
that the condition of heterogeneity in institutional settings (i.e. contradictions between home 
and host country expectations) cannot adequately account for the variation in agency across 
firms that are embedded in different institutional contexts. We contribute to the CIA literature 
by demonstrating the importance of institutionally-shaped coordination structures—a source 
of resource that can enable or constrain action—that meet the institutional demands of host 
contexts in eliciting agency within MNEs.   
 In this paper, we define agency as the motivation and creativity that drive actors to 
break away from institutional constraints and established patterns of behaviour (Dorado, 
2005). Seo and Creed (2002) argue, for example, that individuals become more intentional 
and self-conscious when faced with institutional practices that contradict or conflict with each 
other. In turn, raised consciousness enables individuals to change or challenge institutional 
constraints. We identify different forms of agency along Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) 
conceptualization2: actors’ orientation i) to ‘project’ (i.e. to engage in imaginative generation 
of possible future trajectories of action, and ii) to ‘iterate’ (i.e. to rely on the past) and to 
‘practically-evaluate’ (i.e. to respond to the demands of the present by making practical 
judgments among alternative trajectories of action). Iterative and practical-evaluative agency, 
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given their orientations to the past and present, are less likely than projective agency to 
promote action that transforms or challenges institutions. Hence, we label these forms of 
agency as ‘passive’. By contrast, projective agency, given its orientation to the future, may 
explain actors’ efforts to breakaway from social constraints (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009). 
Hence, we label this form of agency as ‘active’.  
 
Methods 
The research drew on systematic comparative case studies of two large MNEs in the chemical 
industry, headquartered in Germany and the UK, and operating in Italy, Germany, and 
Poland. It aimed to investigate the processes where agency was triggered within a given 
institutional context and MNE coordination structure. It focused on one example of agency: 
subsidiary efforts to change product formulations that were successfully developed by the 
headquarters (HQ).  
We drew on Richard Whitley’s well-known national business systems (NBS) 
typologies to classify our companies. According to Whitley (1999: 60), dominant forms of 
governance such as skills development and control, trust and authority, financial systems, and 
the role of the state in a given nation, what Hollingsworth (2003) calls institutional sectors, 
are seen as shaping different forms of business systems. Managerial coordination and work 
organization within the firm reflect the institutional context in which they are embedded. In 
line with our conceptual interests, we selected two MNEs with distinctive home institutional 
contexts, one originating from a compartmentalized form of governance, the UK, and another 
from a collaborative form of governance, Germany (see Whitley, 1999). Compartmentalized 
national business systems are defined by arm’s length and typically adversarial employment 
relations, with extensive unilateral control by management and strong management-worker 
separation. Consequently, the influence of employee interests on decision-making is low. 
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There is emphasis on the reduction of agency costs through heavy reliance on formal 
mechanisms to order commercial relationships. There is also strong separation of strategic 
and operational management and the exercise of control via financial mechanisms. By 
contrast, collaborative national business systems encourage and support cooperation between 
collective actors. Key labour market institutions of collective bargaining, co-determination 
and initial vocational training call for HRM by a pluralistic style. Employees are encouraged 
to participate in management decisions through works councils and are backed by extensive 
legislation. Managers rely on firm-specific relationships, i.e. commitment, to exercise control 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  
Subsidiaries were selected on the basis of their differences in institutional demands 
from home country-shaped MNE structures. The Polish subsidiary is embedded in a mixture 
of state-organized and compartmentalized national business system where the state continues 
to dominate economic development and guides firm behaviour although its influence is 
declining (Meardi et al., 2009). Similar to other Central Eastern European countries, 
collaboration within sectors is reduced and horizontal linkages between actors across sectors 
and employer-employee interdependence are limited by strong ties of vertical dependence 
(Czaban et al, 2003). Trade unions are politicized, employer associations are weak, and there 
is single-channel employee representation (Meardi et al., 2009). By contrast, the Italian 
subsidiary is embedded in a coordinated industrial district (see e.g. Whitley, 1999). It is 
located in Lombardy, which is a designated chemical district constituting one of the 20 
regions of the European Chemical Regions Network (ECRN). In comparison to the 
compartmentalized system of the UK, there is greater degree of alliance in such districts, with 
extensive commitment between business partners, significant coordination of activities 
through alliances, and greater employer-employee interdependence (Whitley, 2007).   
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As can be seen in table 1, the differences in institutional demands between the 
international mode of coordination in the UK home and those of the German host context 
(commonly referred to in CIA as polar national cases), and the global mode of coordination in 
the German home and those of the Polish host context, were greater than those between the 
structure in the UK and institutional demands of Poland and between the structure in 
Germany and institutional demands of Italy. In the UK and Poland, there is limited 
coordination and long-term commitment to business partners is more difficult to develop. 
Given the strong separation of strategic and operational management in these two countries, 
we label the host country demand as one for operational flexibility. In Germany and Italy, the 
type of business system is collaborative, and the host country demand is one of collaboration. 
We capture home country institutions in their manifestation in MNE coordination structures, 
for these structures are shaped by home country institutions. Greater levels of authoritative 
integration of innovative activities occur in societies where there are stronger constraints on 
opportunistic behaviour. Such integration can be achieved either through state commitment to 
particular innovation goals and/or through inter-firm alliances and business groups as found in 
CMEs (Whitley, 2007: 62). Sharing knowledge and collaborating in the development of 
innovations is easier and less risky in CMEs than in more arm’s length ones such as LMEs 
(ibid.). Hence, there would be a greater tendency for German firms to adopt an integrated 
network model emphasizing collaboration, and for UK firms to adopt an international model 
emphasizing financial rather than operational controls by HQ.  
We identified subsidiaries’ affiliation with a particular MNE coordination structure, 
which was either the international or the combination of integrated network and global 
coordination structure along two dimensions: i) the extent to which capabilities and decision-
making were decentralized, and ii) the extent to which there was high interdependency of 
work between the subsidiaries and HQ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Harzing, 1999). They 
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were based, initially, on our interviews with strategic managers at the British and German 
MNEs and MNE documents on the extent to which capabilities such as R&D were 
decentralized to various global operations. In the course of data collection, we sought further 
evidence of this categorization in subsequent interviews at HQ and subsidiaries. For instance, 
the British MNE’s approach to developing subsidiary capability was much more centralized 
than that of the German MNE operating in Western Europe. The VP of marketing of the 
British MNE argued that “ours would still be seen as a command and control structure”. As 
regards the interdependency of work, knowledge was developed at the centre and 
subsequently transferred to overseas units.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the sampled cases. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In the late 1990s, the British MNE, facing pressure to maximize returns on a single 
project, adopted an international strategy. This shift brought with it formalization, particularly 
in product development, where subsidiaries were primarily regarded as appendages to a 
central domestic corporation. Similarly, given competitive pressures to improve profitability 
in mid-1990, the German MNE adopted a mix of transnational (among Western European 
(WE) sites) and global strategy (among Central and Eastern European (CEE) sites) to 
operating outside the domestic market. In other words, there was an emphasis on specialized 
operations and interdependent relations among WE operations. Whereas, the CEE operations 
were managed centrally by the Austrian CEE HQ, and granted less autonomy than WE 
operations. For instance, they were not involved in new product development.   
 
Data Collection 
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The field study employed 35 open-ended and semi-structured interviews conducted between 
March 2002 and May 2003 with executives overseeing international operations in marketing, 
manufacturing, HR and R&D at the parent companies and their counterparts at the 
subsidiaries, as well as factory visits and document analyses. Information was sought on the 
types of practices that were transferred, resources that were made available by the parent 
company, the role of the parent company in subsidiary’s operations, the procedures that were 
adopted by the parent company for the subsidiary team’s participation in the development and 
launch of an innovative product, and the way the product was modified to meet the 
preferences of the given host market.  
In line with the conceptualization of agency by Emirbayer and Mische (1998), we 
categorized agency as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (defined theoretically on page 9) in the following 
manner. Active agency occurred when subsidiaries displayed new patterns of thinking about 
business objectives in anticipation of future needs (Sadler-Smith et al., 2001). Actors’ efforts 
were directed at projection that promoted the transformation of the institutional arrangement 
of markets. An example of active agency is the introduction of a new product idea to increase 
market share or to fight local competition that leads to a shift in industry trends in a given host 
market. Passive agency was characterized by an actor’s inclination to iterate or apply 
transferred practices (Sadler-Smith et al., 2001). These did not involve any fundamental 
changes to the institutional arrangements of markets. An example of passive agency is the 
adaptation of raw materials in product formulations to the host context that does not 
necessarily lead to transformation in market structure.  
We employed Mill’s method of systematically comparing cases with different types of 
agency. CIA studies often rely on comparisons of how firms perform or adjust to similar 
pressures in two or more national ‘cases’ (e.g. Wever, 1995). Mill’s method is suitable for 
configurational theory (where institutions are viewed as interdependent configurations rather 
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than in isolation) since it explicitly conceptualizes cases as combinations of attributes. In 
other words, different causal conditions are understood in relation to one another and in terms 
of the total picture that they constitute. Similarities and differences across the cases are 
collated in a single, coherent framework. Each unique configuration of causal attributes 
becomes a ‘whole’ that is treated as being distinctive from every other configuration. The 
method does not ask about the independent effect of a variable on the likelihood of a 
particular form of agency. Rather, it considers configurations of values on the independent 
variables as cases. The analysis aims to isolate which cases display active agency. Those 
cases represent the conjunction of causal attributes that produce active agency (George and 
Bennett, 2005).  
Initially, detailed case studies were conducted that captured contextualities in agency 
such as the mode of control that the MNEs exercised on their subsidiaries. This first step 
determined the main conditions to a given outcome within each particular case. This was 
followed by a comparison across cases conducted systematically to allow for theoretical 
generalization. This second step determined necessary and unnecessary conditions3 associated 
with the outcome. Method of agreement and ‘method of difference’ were adopted for 
comparing cases with different types of agency (Mill, 1974). Initially, an instance of active 
agency (Polish subsidiary of British MNE) was compared with another instance of active 
agency (Italian subsidiary of German MNE) to identify similar bundles of conditions 
associated with a similar outcome (method of agreement). This analysis revealed a ‘fit 
between MNE coordination structure and host country demand for operational flexibility or 
collaboration’ as a common condition. This was followed by a method of difference where 
cases with dissimilar types of agency were compared. In other words, an instance of active 
agency (Polish subsidiary of British MNE) was compared with an instance of passive agency 
(Polish subsidiary of German MNE) to identify ‘bundles of conditions’, i.e. a misfit between 
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MNE coordination structure and local host demands, mode of entry into host country, and 
mode of control that explained for the variation. A combination of the two methods 
eliminated ‘mode of entry’ and ‘mode of control’ as necessary conditions and revealed a 
combination of ‘institutional gap’ and ‘MNE coordination structure in its link to host 
demands as influencing different types of agency. 
Open and axial forms of coding were used to identify categories and related sub-
categories respectively for a given type of agency (Strauss and Corbin, 1998): for instance, 
the responses to the question on ‘the way the product was modified by the subsidiary to meet 
the preferences of the given host market’ focused on knowledge transfer. By the same token, 
the question on ‘the resources that were made available by the parent company’ revealed 
information on the organizational capabilities of subsidiaries (Whitley, 2007: 147). As other 
respondents acknowledged these, theoretical saturation was reached and ‘knowledge transfer’ 
and ‘subsidiary capability’ were included as categories in the analysis. Sub-categories were 
identified on the basis of the categories’ properties and dimensions such as the ‘direction of 
knowledge transfer’. To verify the explanatory power of the codes, axial coding was carried 
out to relate sub-categories or conditions to the type of agency outcome (see the appendix for 
an illustrative list of codes and their definitions as well as the statements denoting how these 
are related). 
The reliability of the findings was enhanced by making explicit the procedures that were 
followed for data collection. These procedures included matters of interview protocol, tape 
recordings of interviews, and feedback on transcriptions from participants. Within case 
companies, interview data from a particular work group, such as R&D, were checked against 
responses from another group, such as marketing, to validate findings. Similarly, subsidiary 
and parent company members’ accounts were cross-checked against each other. Protocols 
incorporating schedules of company visits and members to be interviewed were developed. 
 17
 
Interview transcriptions were scanned to identify patterns of active and passive agency at 
subsidiaries, as well as the ‘bundles of conditions’ that accounted for the variation in types of 
agency.  
 
Findings  
Our findings indicate that heterogeneity of institutional settings per se is not sufficient to 
promote active agency. Institutional incompatibilities are unlikely to trigger actors’ reflective 
capacity to redefine existing institutional arrangements if these hinge on unsupportive 
coordination structures. For instance, the German subsidiary of the British MNE displayed 
passive agency despite differences between home and host institutional contexts, because its 
international coordination structure did not support multiplex inter-firm networks, a high 
degree of internal participation, or the reliance on firm-specific relationships in Germany 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Similarly, in spite of an institutional incompatibility between 
the German MNE and the Polish subsidiary, the Polish operation also displayed passive 
agency. The subsidiary was only a ‘peripheral participant’ within the German MNE network 
structure (Clark and Geppert, 2006), and its functional and operational integration within the 
MNE group was weak.  By contrast, we found that where there was a fit between MNE 
structures embedded in home institutional contexts and host context demands, there was 
active agency where the MNE coordination structure served as a means of mobilizing 
resources. These findings are discussed in more detail below. Table 2 provides an overview of 
the contextual influences on types of agency across the subsidiaries of two MNEs.  
   
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Passive Agency at the British MNE’s German Subsidiary 
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In the German subsidiary, there was passive agency in the form of ‘iteration and application’ 
of product formulations (i.e. the introduction of new techniques without major change to 
behaviour) rather than ‘projection’ or planned new uses of knowledge for the future. This was 
related to a misfit between an international mode of coordination shaped by a 
compartmentalized national business system and host demand for collaboration.  
In spite of its local responsiveness to market differences in terms of packaging and 
colour range, the British MNE mainly exported product ideas and recipes to its European 
subsidiaries (i.e. knowledge flowed from the parent to subsidiaries): “Knowledge is 
developed at the centre and exported to overseas units” (strategic research manager, British 
MNE). Subsidiaries were responsible for minor changes to the product.  
For local development of products, usually that is best done very close to the 
customer in a local country, you know, you are putting few extra colours on to 
the colour range or just making a small change to a particular product…We do 
have a discipline, a template, an operating framework that says what is decided 
where, which decisions are to be taken locally, regionally, internationally and 
what things you need to tell people (research and innovation director, British 
MNE). 
 
The rules, procedures and policies for new product development were standardized and 
formalized. The MNE supported the development of its German subsidiary’s innovative 
capability by transferring engineering and manufacturing process improvement know-how 
labelled as the ‘paint plant of the future’, as well as technology needed to adapt product 
formulations developed at HQ to the raw materials in Germany. However, despite the shift 
towards a more centralized mode of coordination in the late 1990s, there was no emphasis on 
expatriate management or international training to acculturate subsidiary members at the 
MNE. The emphasis was on exporting product ideas and improvements in manufacturing 
accuracy. 
With the [X brand], what we did is that we exported it from the UK. So they [the 
German subsidiary] took the same range as the UK, and then gradually over a 
period of time, we formulated a match using their raw materials…They sorted 
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their factory out in terms of their quality. So they are now making it for 
themselves as well as for Czech and Hungary. (general manager R&D Europe) 
 
Product ideas transferred from HQ tended to meet resistance at the German subsidiary owing 
to a pre-existing culture established prior to its acquisition by the British MNE in 1998.  
Four years ago, when I discussed this with Germany and the UK, they 
[Germany] asked ‘why do you want to launch this when other paints cover well, 
better than those of the competitors?’ (observed by the marketing director at the 
Polish subsidiary). 
 
“Special practices such as quality management systems in the UK [at British Chem] are 
spread internationally to improve efficiency and quality. The knowledge that is being 
transferred from HQ has not changed anything fundamentally” (senior product manager at the 
German site). There was limited use of data for continuous improvement, lack of discipline 
and urgency in shop-floor activities. This was, in particular, conspicuous in the filling area. Its 
organizational capability was characterized by the managing director as “cumbersome 
processes in introducing new products, hierarchical decision-making processes with long lines 
of communication, cumbersome sign-off processes, [emphasis on] departmental 
interdependencies rather than an entrepreneurial style, and an ‘it is not my problem’ mindset” 
(managing director at the German subsidiary).   
The subsidiary assumed a reactive orientation to improving its processes in continuous 
steps to meet HQ standards.  
Because people used to be independent for 40 years in their history and all of a 
sudden there comes a parent company, puts a foot on us and says ‘we will guide 
you through some of our standards. We have got company standards that you 
have to follow’, people see that sometimes as pain. (managing director at the 
German subsidiary)    
 
The German subsidiary adhered to old ways of working and pragmatically adapted its 
products to the German market rather than reoriented its strategic approach. 
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Active Agency at the British MNE’s Polish Subsidiary 
In the Polish subsidiary, actors emphasized experimentation and risk taking. They assumed an 
active agency by anticipating future market needs. This was associated with a fit between an 
international mode of coordination shaped by a compartmentalized national business system 
and host demand for operational flexibility. 
 As in the former case, rules and procedures for new product development were 
standardized and formalized, and product recipes and manufacturing-related knowledge were 
exported from the HQ to Poland. “All recipes are owned, in fact, by the UK. So if we want to 
make changes to the recipes, those need to be approved by the UK” (marketing director at the 
Polish subsidiary). This was related to time and resource constraints such as the size of the 
R&D department at the Polish site (head of research lab at the Polish subsidiary). If the Polish 
site had an idea for a new product, its recipe could be prepared in Poland, the test results 
discussed with the parent company, and the product sold under the international brand name. 
However, despite the importation of product ideas from HQ, the Polish site displayed an 
active orientation to changing templates for behaviour by, for instance, introducing new 
products to the market that shifted the industry trend.  
In terms of the sophistication in the Polish market now…there was no really 
major paint company there, the paint companies have gone in and started to 
grow the market from a value point of view, getting them into colour, bringing 
innovation into the marketplace...As a market, it has proved really responsive to 
the innovation…They are responding much more readily than say the Germans 
did, who have perhaps been stuck in their way. (general manager R&D Europe)    
 
New product development was discussed on a regular basis with the HQ. Although the 
subsidiary was perceived as the least technologically advanced of all players in Poland, and 
had the smallest and the least technically equipped R&D lab, it had responsibility over low-
volume, highly profitable, and value-added brands during the preliminary phase of the launch 
on the market (marketing director at the Polish subsidiary). There was heavy emphasis on 
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experimentation at the site, which was also evident in the site’s receptivity to new ideas from 
HQ. “They [the Polish subsidiary] are hungry for ideas. This is not to say they do not have 
good ideas of their own, but they are hungry” (general manager for R&D Europe). By 
contrast to the former case and despite its similarity in ownership structure, the Polish site 
engaged in proactive search for ideas in the British MNE’s pool of expertise and introduced 
these to the market. In 1998, it introduced colours in the market when the paint industry was 
moving in the direction of the tinting business.  
About four years ago, we were looking at different products to launch which 
would be innovative, different and better than what the competition has got. 
There were no products…the market at that point in time seemed to be following 
the way of developing the tinting business…Looking at the UK market, there 
were suggestions that launching colours would not be a bad idea, because it 
works in the UK. However, we are afraid of advices of doing something because 
it works in the UK. So we did not really know which would be the preferred 
route. (marketing director at the Polish subsidiary) 
 
When market results pointed to important benefits to consumers, the site was encouraged to 
launch colours, and subsequently raised its rank to a second position in the marketplace.  
 
Active Agency at the German MNE’s Italian Subsidiary 
In the Italian subsidiary, actors took strategic action to transform the market (i.e. assumed 
active agency). This was related to a fit between an integrated network mode of coordination 
shaped by a collaborative national business system and host demand for collaboration,.  
 The Italian subsidiary, which had been operating as a greenfield site since 1935, 
participated in the strong, tightly-knit network of Euro-team meetings of the MNE. This 
network encouraged both the importing and exporting of knowledge on product ideas between 
HQ and the subsidiary (i.e. knowledge flowed both ways between the parent and the 
subsidiary). It focused on building a strong corporate culture, acculturating members of the 
network through international management training and secondment. Although there was not 
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a transfer of manufacturing excellence techniques to the Italian site, HQ-developed product 
recipes were introduced for local adaptation. The subsidiary was able to change not only 
fragrances and colourants, but also the viscosity levels of products, upon lengthy negotiations 
with HQ. For instance, it re-launched a product formula to replace the bio-degradable old raw 
material. Initial studies were carried out in Germany. The process was then adapted in Italy, 
France, and Spain.  
We worked 10 years ago to re-launch formula with a new raw material. The 
reason was the bio-degradability of the old raw material. So an international 
team was established. We were part of this team. First, studies were done in 
Germany. We then worked to adapt the process in Italy, France and 
Spain…High viscosity was very important for Italy, but not so important for 
other countries. So we had to find a way to increase the viscosity of the product 
having the same level of cost as in other countries. We followed a very precise 
process with specific parameters. The results were then sent to Germany” (R&D 
manager at the Italian subsidiary). 
 
Their strong test results convinced HQ to approve the project. Going even further, the 
subsidiary proactively took the decision to introduce a marsiglia-based variant to fight 
competition from international brands, particularly in softeners, even though it was strongly 
opposed by the parent company.  
It is a huge trend for Italy. Marsiglia is a soap bar, which was used in the past, in 
the 20th century, a soap used by my grandmother. It has a very characteristic 
odour. It is quite well known for being quite effective...It is cheap and 
environmentally friendly...About four to five years ago, we saw a trend in the 
detergents [among local producers] that were using this marsiglia soap as a 
marketing concept. It was an enormous success…We were the first to introduce 
it into dishwashing, then into softeners. Can you imagine into the softeners? It 
took us three to four years to convince Germany in this case that marsiglia was 
an interesting trend. (product manager at the Italian subsidiary) 
 
Such experimentation and risk-taking at the subsidiary provided the variety and diversity of 
ideas necessary to develop new business opportunities and then put them forward to parent 
company managers. The subsidiary initiated changes of a strategic nature to fight competition. 
It also enabled HQ to benefit from local experiences. This is illustrated by the Italian 
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subsidiary’s experience in physical behaviour of particle sizes in dispersion and shared stress, 
which required trials in a facility that did not exist outside of Italy: “We have this kind of 
experience and facility here, thus had more possibility than colleagues in Germany [HQ] or in 
Spain and France to perform trials. We also have experience in [Y brand] softener, because 
Lomazzo was one of the first plants to produce softeners in the [German MNE] 
Group…Speaking of shared stress in such detail was not usual in our field, but that was what 
we made use of” (R&D manager at the Italian subsidiary). 
 
Passive Agency at the German MNE’s Polish Subsidiary 
In the Polish subsidiary, actors displayed passive agency. This was associated with a misfit 
between a highly centralized global mode of coordination among the CEE operations and a 
host demand for operational flexibility. 
 By contrast to its Italian counterpart, there was no evidence of the German MNE 
importing product ideas from its Polish subsidiary. Although the MNE had been in operation 
since 1931 in Poland, its historical ties were not as strong as those with, for instance, 
Hungary. The MNE emphasized the exporting of marketing techniques and technical tests to 
Poland. “[A] lot of the marketing mix is developed in the HQ. And the countries are 
responsible for an excellent execution of this initiative” (Austrian marketing manager at the 
Polish subsidiary). “95 per cent of the communication is always going through Austria. When 
Romania wants some information from Poland, they are asking us and we are asking Poland” 
(brand manager at CEE HQ). New product development decisions were also taken at HQ.  
A country can come and say it would be interesting to develop for example soap 
paste, which is still in use in countries like Romania. Then we get a proposal to 
develop such a product. But they do not develop it in their own 
country…because you need the background…I know in the HQ many persons 
for 17 years and know where they have started…So we [CEE HQ] have the 
networking advantage owing to the long history. (R&D manager at CEE HQ) 
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As a member of the CEE network, the Polish subsidiary was managed from a more 
centralized global approach whereby decisions were taken by the Austrian HQ. The 
subsidiary did not have any responsibility in new product development or over technical 
modification of existing products for a strategic reorientation. Rather, it prepared labels in 
accordance with the Polish law, registered detergents with the Polish authorities, and 
performed quality checks on locally-produced goods (R&D manager at the Polish subsidiary). 
According to the HQ, “there is mismanagement in the company. The company is not run 
properly. The investment is not there. State-of-the-art product cannot be made. There is good 
technology and highly skilled people available, but the whole system is totally bankrupt” 
(corporate VP manufacturing at German MNE). The emphasis at the Polish site was in 
bringing local practices into line with those of the parent company where actors oriented 
towards the iteration of product formulations. 
 
Comparative case discussion: Agency in its link to a fit between MNE coordination 
structure shaped by home country institutions and host context demand  
The findings point to variation in the type of agency displayed across subsidiaries. Whether 
agency is passive or active seems to depend on a fit between MNE coordination structure 
embedded in a particular home institutional setting and host country demand.   
As the findings at the British MNE demonstrate, the coordination of subsidiaries in an 
international form, i.e. as appendages to a central domestic corporation, encourages the 
exporting of knowledge. The MNE neither has HQ personnel serving its German and Polish 
subsidiaries, nor provides technical international training to its subsidiary members. Rather, it 
chooses to standardize and formalize rules, procedures and policies to co-ordinate and control 
activities. There is a strong separation of strategic and operational management and the 
exercise of control via financial mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Furthermore, the 
 25
 
deficiency of the compartmentalized national business system in the area of skill training as 
that in the UK (Lane, 1996; Whitley, 1999) has negative implications for the MNE’s long-
term growth strategy. Anglo-Saxon managers typically receive education in ‘general’ 
management with a strong emphasis on finance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). “The much 
lesser degree of institutional embeddedness of British firms and their only weak exposure to a 
consistent and widely obligatory system of institutionalized rule systems [in comparison to 
German firms], endows firms with greater autonomy but also leaves them far less supported 
by and implanted in various kinds of networks” (Lane, 2000a: 195). As the mode-of-entry 
into Germany and Poland indicates, the British MNE chose to limit commitment to and 
mutual dependence on subsidiaries through acquisitions. Its looser inter-firm networks and 
fewer multiplex relationships with capital ties dominated by purely financial interests, relative 
to German firms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), created room for the Polish subsidiary to 
display strategic orientation. The international coordination structure offered a fit with the 
host country demand for operational flexibility of the Polish subsidiary.  
By contrast, a misfit of the German case with the British MNE’s coordination 
structure explains why we found rather passive form of agency, i.e. resistance to product ideas 
developed at the British HQ. The operation’s rich administrative heritage has a role to play in 
its reliance on the past and passive orientation to new ideas. The subsidiary is characterized 
by strongly embedded routines that overlap with many other structures that are common in the 
German institutional context (see Hall and Soskice, 2001), which inform actors’ orientations. 
As Howard-Grenville (2005: 633) argues, “if routines are experienced as primarily embedded 
in cultural structures of coordination, orientations toward them might be more iterative, as the 
enactment of these structures tends to draw heavily from the past”. By the same token, Seo 
and Creed (2002) contend that the greater the nonadaptability, or the extent to which 
institutional arrangements are deeply embedded and tightly coupled, the less likely will be the 
 26
 
reflective shift in collective consciousness. Managers rely on firm-specific relationships, i.e. 
commitments, to exercise control (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Their functional conception 
of managerial control suggests stronger integration of operational functions. A high degree of 
internal participation tends to foster consensus and cooperation in the implementation of 
decisions (Rogers and Streeck, 1994). Cooperation that takes place through a variety of 
mechanisms in Germany, such as networks, associations and the state, can be constraining for 
the adoption of a set of practices along an alternative mode (e.g. Streeck, 1997). The 
multiplex inter-firm networks in Germany can act as a restraint on agency in the absence of 
supportive MNE coordination structures.  
Unlike the German MNE, the British MNE does not emphasize social integration 
mechanisms to break institutional logics at its German subsidiary. There is inconsistency 
between the local demands for collaboration and commitment and home institutional 
pressures for standardization and formalization manifested in a centralized approach to 
coordinating MNE activities that encourages passive agency. This contradicts the argument 
within CIA that discrepancies between institutionalized rules and situational demands for 
resources can create room for actors to engage in innovative changes (e.g. Crouch, 2005). 
Although comparative institutional analysts (e.g. Streeck and Thelen, 2005) and neo-
institutionalists (e.g Seo and Creed, 2002) argue that ambiguity created by diversity in 
institutional environments can create room for strategic responses to institutions, our study 
indicates that innovative capacities can be limited (as in the German subsidiary) by an 
unsupportive MNE coordination structure (such as that of the British MNE).  
In comparison to the British MNE, the coordination structure of the German MNE 
functioned rather differently, having different implications for agency. In the Italian case, the 
German MNE coordinated its operations by emphasizing the development of horizontal 
linkages and subsidiary capabilities through cross-functional teamwork, training and visits for 
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exchange of experience between HQ and local units (R&D Manager at German Chem’s 
Italian subsidiary). The multiple linkages between HQ and overseas subsidiaries enhanced the 
subsidiary’s ability to influence key HQ decisions, particularly in product specifications and 
design. The Euro-team meetings, which served as integrating mechanisms between various 
research teams (cf. Zander and Sölvell, 2000), socialized local managers into the corporate 
culture and created a network for the cross-fertilization of ideas between subsidiaries and HQ. 
This is consistent with the characteristic of a collaborative national business system where 
managers adopt a functional conception of managerial control (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
This refers to a greater integration of operational functions through technical specialization or 
strong personal involvement than in British firms. The company emphasizes the acculturation 
of its subsidiaries through international transfers of managers and international training (Lane, 
2000b). This is in line with the long-termist approach to development that is complemented 
by a highly developed system of vocational education and training in Germany (Ferner et al., 
2001). German MNEs are more likely to send out expatriates to their subsidiaries than MNEs 
from other countries, in particular from the USA and the UK (Harzing, 2001). The ‘indirect 
personal form of control’ through an emphasis on strong corporate culture (Harzing, 1999) at 
the German MNE is particularly evident in its more developed subsidiaries, such as the Italian 
operation, that participate in the WE network of new product development. The ‘direct 
personal mode of control’ through the use of expatriates is more noticeable at the less 
developed Polish site than at the Italian subsidiary. As the Italian subsidiary demonstrates, the 
German MNE’s institutionally characteristic attempt “to recreate the model which combines a 
high-skill work force with a matching organization of technology also in other countries, by 
undertaking a systematic effort to transform the labour force” (Lane, 2000a: 203) through an 
integrated network of knowledge exchange encourages active agency. Actors respond 
proactively to knowledge diffused by the parent company by revising product designs that are 
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directed at the future needs of the organization. In short, the more proactive orientation of the 
Italian site is related to an MNE coordination structure that is compatible with host country 
demands.  
A comparison with the case of the German MNE’s Polish subsidiary illustrates that a 
network structure of coordination did not serve as a medium for active agency, as in its Italian 
counterpart. The CEE network, led by Austria, to which countries such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia belong, are granted less operational flexibility 
than those of the WE network. One of the reasons for this is that the WE network generates 
about 70 per cent of German MNE’s net sales. This gives these subsidiaries the importance of 
weight: “If I am the bigger country and I have a problem with the blue [variant of a product], 
even if in all other countries the blue is an interesting concept but there is a problem 
conceptually in Italy, then the co-ordinator, the steerer will say maybe I need to listen to you 
more than a country that weighs five per cent” (product manager at German MNE’s Italian 
subsidiary). In other words, the Polish subsidiary did not have access to resources found in the 
MNEs network structures. Rather, it displayed passive agency associated with a misfit of 
MNE coordination structure with host country context demand. 
The key message of our comparative analysis is clearly demonstrated by the two cases 
that are embedded in the same host country (Poland), which display opposite approaches to 
agency. We observed passive agency at the Polish subsidiary of the German MNE, which 
resulted from the failure of the German MNE’s coordination structure to respond to the host 
demand for operational flexibility. By contrast, the Polish subsidiary of the British MNE 
benefitted from a fit between the MNE’s international coordination mode and the host 
demand for operational flexibility. As the development of local competences was not 
constrained by obligational ties to partners or high levels of MNE control (e.g. Otterbeck, 
1981), as it was with the German MNE, the Polish subsidiary of the British MNE could 
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develop distinctive capabilities by drawing on its local expertise. Our comparison of the two 
Polish cases reveals that the strategic approach of the British MNE was more supportive of a 
proactive orientation based on the provision of operational flexibility that allowed for local 
solutions and a local context that supplied knowledge of actors to the process. In comparison 
to the British case, where significant improvements of financial performance were sufficient 
to enhance the subsidiary’s power position, the Polish subsidiary of the German MNE 
retained its position as a ‘peripheral participant’ within the MNE’s global network structure. 
Its functional and operational integration within the MNE group, a precondition for 
developing financial performance in diversified quality production-focused German MNEs 
(e.g. Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), remained rather weak, discouraging new patterns of 
thinking about business objectives. Thus, our study confirms the contention in comparative 
institutionalism that “‘innovation’ [taken to mean practices that are unfamiliar in the host 
context] may be easier in less actively regulated business and employment systems” (e.g. 
Almond et al., 2005: 281). However, our study goes beyond this to show that the emergence 
of active agency depends on a compatibility between an MNE’s coordination structure and 
the needs and demands of its host country subsidiary. 
   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we contribute to addressing the paradox of embedded agency. A significant part 
of the promise of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) as a research area is to 
establish a broader vision of agency in relation to institutions, one that avoids depicting actors 
as either cultural dopes or hypermuscular institutional entrepreneurs. Our aim is to understand 
the conditions that enable institutionally-embedded actors to engage in strategic action (in our 
case, in the area of product development) despite institutional pressures towards stasis.  
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 Heterogeneity of institutional settings is often assumed to stimulate change.  Our 
research does not support this. What it shows, by contrast to key arguments of the mainstream 
CIA literature, is that active agency by subsidiaries corresponds to situations where the MNE 
coordination structures are supportive and correspond to the needs and demands of the host 
country subsidiary. This is not just an ‘institutional distance’ argument as is commonly 
understood in IB. It refers to whether local institutions support the subsidiary to take 
advantage of specific opportunities conditioned by the home country institutions. This is 
based on the conceptualization of institutions as distinct national constellations, drawn from 
CIA, to understand how and why different institutions impact firm behaviour. Our findings 
point to the need to revisit the conceptualization of ‘institutional distance’ in IB to consider 
which institutions matter in what ways.  
 Accordingly, our case discussion has shown that, at the British MNE, while decision 
structures were more formal and centralized, subsidiaries had fairly substantial operational 
flexibility to make decisions in their daily business. This stimulated active agency in the 
Polish subsidiary, which, because of the legacy of state control was both accustomed to 
centralized coordination and keen to generate the much needed innovation. However, the 
German subsidiary, embedded in its own national industry networks, struggled with 
centralized coordination based in the UK and displayed only passive agency. At the German 
MNE, the emphasis on integrated network coordination and a strong corporate culture 
inspired active agency in its Italian subsidiary, which also had a strong tradition of innovation 
and collaboration within its local networks. By contrast, the Polish subsidiary remained on the 
periphery of the core collaborative MNE network that made key decisions and distributed 
resources for innovation, and displayed passive agency. 
 The findings have implications for both parent company and subsidiary managers. For 
the former, they point to the importance of aligning coordination structures with host context 
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requirements to facilitate innovative changes. For the latter, the results highlight the 
significance of striving for ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Alvarez et al., 2005), i.e. for a balance 
between seeking legitimacy and maintaining unique identity to differentiate oneself.  
Additional research could contribute further to studies on agency within the MNE by 
shedding light on how agency at the individual level can influence national-level institutions. 
Most studies to date have focused on the organizational level of analysis, neglecting the 
orientations, motivations and impact of individual actors (Reay et al., 2006).  At the same 
time, as action is embedded in organizations which are, in turn, shaped by institutions, it is 
critical that we address both organizational and institutional levels of analysis to facilitate a 
more comprehensive understanding of agency. Such multilevel research has been suggested 
as a promising avenue of research within the framework of institutional theory (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Reay et al., 2006).  
 
Endnotes 
1. Hollingsworth (2003: 132) recognizes that institutional analysis occurs at multiple 
levels. At the first level, there are the basic norms and rules of a society. On the next 
level of analysis, there are institutional arrangements that coordinate various 
economic actors. These consist of markets, associations, communities and clans. The 
next level consists of the institutional sectors. The norms and rules of a society 
influence the array of institutional arrangements, and both of these influence the 
nature of, and the relationship among, various institutional sectors that include a 
society’s distinct system of education, legal system, business system and financial 
system. We focus here on transformation of institutional arrangements. 
2. Although Oliver (1991) represents the first systematic attempt at articulating the range 
of potential responses available to organizations facing institutional pressures, her 
view reflects a unidimensional understanding of agency. A problem with such a view 
is that it does not clearly specify the extent to which actors can affect the social world 
for them to be regarded as having a high versus a low level of agency (Battilana and 
D’Aunno, 2009). We adopt here the multidimensional view, following Emirbayer and 
Mische (1998), where actors’ engagement with the social world can both reproduce 
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and transform an environment’s structures. We conceptualize agency as a temporally 
embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), 
but also oriented towards the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) 
and towards the present (as a capacity to respond to the demands of the present) 
(Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009).  
3. A condition is necessary for a given outcome if it is always present when the outcome 
occurs, i.e. when the outcome cannot occur in its absence (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Consequently, an unnecessary condition is that which is 
always absent when the outcome occurs. Charles Ragin (1987) has coined this term to 
distinguish between conditions that are associated with the outcome and those that are 
not related to the outcome. This is further exemplified by Rohwer (2011) where the 
method is argued to trim components that are logically unnecessary for the presence 
of the outcome in one or more case(s).  
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Table 1 Case selection 
 
 
Cases British MNE-German 
Sub 
British MNE-Polish Sub German MNE-Italian 
Sub 
German MNE-Polish Sub 
Fit between MNE 
coordination structure 
and host context 
Misfit between 
international mode and 
demand for collaboration 
Fit between international 
mode & demand for 
operational flexibility 
Fit between integrated 
network mode & demand 
for collaboration 
Misfit between highly 
centralized global mode 
and demand for operational 
flexibility 
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Table 2 Types of agency at subsidiaries 
 
Bundles of conditions British MNE’s 
German Sub 
British MNE’s Polish Sub German MNE’s Italian Sub  German MNE’s Polish Sub 
MNE coordination 
structure 
International mode International mode   Integrated network mode (where the 
subsidiary is a respected member of 
the Western European network with 
emphasis on experimentation) 
Highly centralized global mode 
(where the subsidiary is a member 
of the Eastern European network 
with low autonomy to experiment) 
Host context demand Demand for 
collaboration 
Demand for operational 
flexibility 
Demand for collaboration Demand for operational flexibility 
Fit between MNE 
coordination structure 
and host context demand 
Misfit between 
international mode of 
coordination and 
demand for 
collaboration 
Fit between international 
mode of coordination and 
demand for operational 
flexibility 
Fit between integrated network 
mode of coordination and demand 
for collaboration 
Misfit between highly centralized 
global mode of coordination and 
demand for operational flexibility 
Mode of entry into host 
country 
Acquisition (1998) Acquisition (1996) Greenfield (1935) Joint venture in 1931, full 
ownership in 1992 
Mode of control Direct, impersonal: Standardized and formalized new 
product development procedures 
 
Indirect, personal:  
Emphasis on strong ‘corporate 
culture’, acculturating subsidiaries 
through international management 
training and secondment 
Direct, personal:  
centralized control whereby 
decisions are taken by the 
Austrian HQ 
Type of agency Passive: iterative 
agency (resistance to 
product ideas) 
 
Active: projective agency 
(change in industry trend 
with the launch of colours) 
Active: projective agency (industry 
trend setting by launching 
marsiglia-based products that were 
initially resisted by the parent) 
Passive: Practical-evaluative 
agency (registering and labelling 
detergents with the Polish 
authorities, and performing 
quality checks on local products) 
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Appendix Illustrative list of codes associated with agency 
 
Categories 
related to the 
agency outcome 
Sub-categories British MNE German MNE 
Knowledge 
transfer (i.e. the 
direction in which 
product ideas and 
process know-how 
flow) 
Exporting/ 
Importing of 
knowledge 
“Knowledge is developed at the centre and exported to 
overseas units” 
“With the [X brand], what we did is that we exported it 
from the UK. So they [the German subsidiary] took the 
same range as the UK, and then gradually over a period 
of time, we formulated a match using their raw materials”  
“All recipes are owned, in fact, by the UK. So if we [the 
Polish subsidiary] want to make changes to the recipes, 
those need to be approved by the UK. There are people 
from the UK labs who come here and advise”. 
“Marketing units operate in Euro team [which consist of a strategic 
business unit member from the headquarters and marketing 
managers across Europe. The Euro team notion is quite important. 
They aid in forging interdependency among [Western European] 
subsidiaries to stimulate new product development”.  
“A country can come and say it would be interesting to develop for 
example soap paste, which is still in use in countries like Romania. 
Then we [HQ] get a proposal to develop such a product. But they 
[CEE subsidiaries] do not develop it in their own country”.  
 
Categories 
related to the 
agency outcome 
Sub-categories German subsidiary of British 
MNE 
Polish subsidiary of 
British MNE 
Italian subsidiary of German 
MNE 
Polish subsidiary of German 
MNE 
Mode of control 
(i.e. the extent to 
which decision 
making is 
centralized, 
standardized and 
formalized) 
Direct/indirect-
personal/impersona
l nature of control 
“We do have a discipline, template, an operating 
framework that says what is decided where, which 
decisions are to be taken locally, regionally, 
internationally, and what things you need to tell people”. 
“We are much better organized in terms of having 
country managers and functional structures, which are 
much more European-based. So in terms of R&D, 
although we have some labs such as that in France and in 
Poland, our activities are all pretty well managed in terms 
of knowing what is going on and who is doing what”. 
 “You [HQ] invest in a lot of 
infrastructure, not only 
machinery and equipment, but 
you build up very much in 
people, education, training”.  
“We [HQ] are sending people to 
Germany in the form of job 
rotation…It may be short period 
for training purposes and visits 
for exchange of experience 
between headquarters and local 
units”. 
 “A lot of the marketing mix is 
developed in the [CEE] 
headquarters. And the countries 
are responsible for excellent 
execution of this initiative”.  
“95 per cent of the 
communication is always going 
through Austria. When Romania 
wants some information from 
Poland, they are asking us and 
we are asking Poland”. 
Subsidiary 
capability (i.e. the 
interest in and 
ability to improve 
products and 
processes) 
Extensive/ limited 
emphasis on 
experimentation 
“Four years ago, when I 
discussed this with 
Germany and the UK, they 
[Germany] asked ‘why do 
you want to launch this 
when other paints cover 
well, better than those of 
“About four years ago, we 
were looking at different 
products to launch which 
would be innovative, 
different and better than 
what the competition has 
got. There were no 
“About four to five years ago, 
we [the Italian subsidiary] saw a 
trend in the detergents that were 
using this marsiglia soap as a 
marketing concept. It was an 
enormous success…We were the 
first to introduce it into 
“We [CEE HQ in Austria] 
together with the German Chem 
HQ develop a formula on paper, 
then we make a production trial 
in the CEE country where we 
want to produce this formula. 
The local R&D controls the 
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the competitors?’”  products…the market at 
that point in time seemed 
to be following the way of 
developing tinting 
business…Looking at the 
UK market, there were 
suggestions that launching 
colours would not be a bad 
idea, because it works in 
the UK. However, we are 
afraid of advices of doing 
something because it 
works in the UK. So we 
did not really know which 
would be the preferred 
route”. 
dishwashing, then into 
softeners… In the beginning the 
test results were not enough to 
sell to the top management that 
it was a good process, but then 
they realized that it was 
possible”.   
production trial and makes all 
specification parameters, tests 
on density, solubility, the rinsing 
behaviour”. 
“There is mismanagement in the 
company. The company is not 
run properly…State-of-the-art 
product cannot be made. There 
is good technology and highly-
skilled people available, but the 
whole system is totally 
bankrupt”.  
 
